



COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA  
GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL

December 2, 2015

*Sent Only Via Electronic Transmission*

Jill S. Wolfe, Esquire  
Office of Open Records  
Commonwealth Keystone Building  
400 North Street, 4<sup>th</sup> Floor  
Harrisburg, PA 17120-0225

Re: *James Hamill/Newswatch 16 v. Pa. State Police*  
AP 2015-2546(PSP/RTKL 2015-0668)  
Brief of Appellee  
Right-to-Know Law ("RTKL"), 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-67.3104.

Encl. Affidavit of Sergeant Carl J. Veach

Dear Appeals Officer Wolfe:

I am responding on behalf of my clients, the Pennsylvania State Police ("PSP") to the November 9, 2015, appeal filed by James Hamill/Newswatch 16 ("Requester") regarding the denial of his Right-To-Know Law ("RTKL") request (PSP/RTK No. 2015-0668, now the subject of the Office of Open Records ("OOR") Appeal No. 2015-2546). Please accept this correspondence as my formal entry of appearance in the matter and kindly direct your future communications to me.

**STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

On September 15, 2015, PSP received a RTKL Request ("Request") from Requester wherein he requested: "Any and all after actions reports compiled for PA State Police relating to the manhunt, search & inter-agency operation that led to the arrest of Eric Frein October 30 '14... ." By letter dated September 22, 2015, Requester was notified in accordance with RTKL section 67.902(b) that PSP required an additional thirty (30) days to prepare its final response to his request. In a letter dated October 22, 2015, PSP provided Requester with its final response denying his request. On November 9, 2015, Requester filed the instant appeal with the Office of Open Records. Following his appeal and submissions to the OOR, PSP re-evaluated its final response. Through this submission, PSP is providing Requester with a redacted copy of the Blooming Grove Shooting After Action/Improvement Plan ("AAR/IP" or "Report"). For the reasons set forth below, PSP requests that Mr. Hamill's appeal be dismissed.



## **ARGUMENT**

The RTKL only requires Commonwealth agencies to provide documents that are public records. 65 P.S. § 67.301. It is well settled that PSP is a Commonwealth agency within the meaning of the RTKL. *Id.* at § 67.101; *Dekok v. PSP*, Dkt. AP 2011-0086 \* 4. A document is not a public record if: (1) it is specifically exempted from disclosure in section 67.708 of the RTKL; (2) it is exempt under other federal or state law; or (3) it is protected by a privilege. See *id.* § 67.102 (defining “Public Record”).

PSP has provided Requester with the AAR/IP. However, some information contained in the responsive record is exempt from disclosure pursuant to Sections 708(b)(2), (b)(10)(i), and (b)(16) of the RTKL and has been redacted accordingly. The Report is a document which details PSP’s strengths in responding to the Blooming Grove Incident as well as the areas where PSP could improve in responding to a similar incident. The Report also includes recommendation to ensure that improvements are made in the areas where PSP’s response to the Incident was deficient. The Report contains law enforcement sensitive information and has been classified as “For Official Use Only.” The information redacted pursuant to Sections (b)(2) and (b)(10)(i) of the RTKL is highly confidential and reflects predecisional deliberations as the information contained under the headings of “Primary Areas for Improvement” and “Action Recommendations Identified” were used to implement new tactical and strategic steps to ensure that any deficiencies are cured and public dissemination of this information would be reasonably likely to threaten a public protection activity.

Additionally, redactions have also been made pursuant to section (b)(2) of the RTKL for information related to PSP’s Bureau of Emergency and Special Operations (“BESO”). BESO provides PSP with additional means of dealing with high-risk, special emergency, or other unusual situations where special training in communications, tactics, and the use of special equipment is desirable. The redactions were made because the section in the Report on BESO details strategic and tactical information which is critical to BESO’s mission and public knowledge of this strategic and tactical information could impact on BESO’s ability to apprehend criminal suspects.

Lastly, redactions have also been made pursuant to Section 708(b)(16) of the RTKL. Information related to sealed search warrants, witness names, and statements made by the suspect at the time of his capture have been redacted because this information was used during the criminal investigation and is “related” to the criminal investigation. 65 P.S. 67.708(b)(16) Therefore, this information is exempt from disclosure. Further, redactions have also been made pursuant to Section 708(b)(16) in regard to information that was extracted from PSP Incident Report No. N06-1247916 as it concerns potential criminal activity that is currently being investigated.

## **CONCLUSION**

In conclusion, based upon the RTKL, case law, and the facts contained within the Affidavit of Sergeant Veach, the Pennsylvania State Police respectfully requests that you dismiss Mr. Hamill’s appeal as he has been provided records that responsive to his request. If you have

any doubt as to the merits of this case, PSP respectfully requests that you convene a hearing in this matter. Should you determine a hearing to be unnecessary, I thank you in advance for your thoughtful deliberations.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Nolan B. Meeks".

Nolan B. Meeks, Esquire  
Assistant Counsel - Pennsylvania State Police  
Governor's Office of General Counsel  
717.783.5568 / [nomeeks@pa.gov](mailto:nomeeks@pa.gov)

Enclosure: Redacted Copy of Blooming Grove Shooting  
After Action/Improvement Plan

cc: James W. Hamill (w/ encl.) (*sent only via electronic transmission*)  
William A. Rozier (w/ encl.) (*sent only via electronic transmission*)

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA  
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE

AFFIDAVIT OF  
SERGEANT CARL J. VEACH  
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE  
BUREAU OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania :

:

:

:

County of Dauphin :

BEFORE ME, the undersigned notary public, appeared the affiant, CARL J. VEACH, on this 1<sup>st</sup> day of December 2015, who being duly sworn by me according to law, stated the following:

1. My name is Carl J. Veach. Being over eighteen years of age, I am fully competent to execute this affidavit, which avers as true and correct only the facts known to me personally and only such opinions as I am qualified to express.

2. I am a Sergeant with the Pennsylvania State Police ("PSP" or "Department"), presently serving as the Homeland Security Programs Coordinator. In this capacity, I am authorized to make this statement on behalf of the Department and its Acting Commissioner, Tyree C. Blocker, in the interests of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and its citizens.

3. I assumed the duties of my present position on January 5, 2009. My duties encompass the management of the Departments After Action/Improvement Plan Reporting Program. This entails reviewing all AAR/IPs prepared by field personnel to ensure compliance with existing regulations and offer suggestions to further enhance the report. I am the author of the Blooming Grove Shooting After Action Report/Improvement Plan ("AAR/IP" or "Report").

4. Following major incidents handled by PSP, PSP, at the discretion of Command Staff, will put together an AAR/IP. The Report is designed to detail PSP's strengths in responding to the major incident as well as areas where PSP could improve its response and to provide recommendations to ensure improvements are made in the identified areas.

5. I have prepared this affidavit in response to a RTKL appeal filed by James Hamill. ("Requester") with the Office of Open Records ("OOR"), which has been docketed by OOR as N<sup>o</sup> AP 2015-2546. I do so in order to clarify PSP's response to Mr. Hamill's request and subsequent appeal.

6. To illustrate the importance of this AAR/IP PSP has classified this document as "For Official Use Only" (FOUO), however, in the spirit of the RTKL, PSP is providing Requester with a version of the Report that has been redacted for information that is

predecisional, related to a criminal investigation, or would jeopardize or threaten a public safety activity which is all information that is exempt from disclosure under the RTKL.

7. The Report itself is broken down into the following sections: Executive Summary, Incident Overview, Analysis of the Incident, and Conclusion. Additionally, attached to the report is an Appendix.

8. PSP has redacted each section of the Report titled "Primary Areas for Improvement." These sections contain law enforcement sensitive information related to deficiencies in PSP's response to the Blooming Grove Incident. These sections provide a comprehensive critical self-assessment of PSP's response overall as well as the response by each PSP division, bureau, and office that was involved with responding to the Incident.

9. The information contained in the sections titled "Primary Areas for Improvement" was used to provide recommendations in order to improve upon the identified deficiencies. These recommendations are provided in other sections in the Report. Therefore, the information contained in these sections is exempt from disclosure pursuant to Section 708(b)(10)(i) of the RTKL as a record containing predecisional deliberations. These sections form the basis of the steps that PSP will implement to put in place procedures to ensure that the deficiencies that occurred in the Blooming Grove Incident will not occur in the future.

10. Further, the information provide in the "Primary Areas for Improvement" sections are exempt from disclosure pursuant to Section 708(b)(2) of the RTKL. As stated above, these sections contain information related to every phase of the Blooming Grove Operation, including tactical information. If this information were made publically available it would jeopardize or threaten a public safety activity i.e. it would affect PSP's ability to respond to major incidents like the Blooming Grove Shooting. Public release would provide detailed information on the deficiencies in PSP's ability to respond to a similar situation and would provide a roadmap to individuals with nefarious intentions regarding PSP's tactical and strategic operations, personnel capabilities, equipment capabilities, communication capabilities, and incident command management.

11. Based upon the need for improvement in certain areas when responding to an incident such as Blooming Grove, PSP has identified actions it can take in the future to successfully respond to such an incident. These actions can be found in the sections of the Report titled "Action Recommendations Identified." The information provided in these sections of the report provide the tactical and strategic steps that PSP will take to ensure that the deficiencies identified in the "Primary Areas for Improvement" sections are cured and that PSP will be even more effective when placed in a situation when it must respond to an incident like Blooming Grove.

12. The information contained in these sections are exempt from disclosure pursuant to Sections 708(b)(2) and (b)(10)(i) of the RTKL. The information identified in the sections "Action Recommendations Identified" was used to change PSP's overall tactics, strategy, and policy when responding to a similar major incident. Thus, this information is exempt as predecisional information. Furthermore, public release would jeopardize or threaten a public safety activity i.e. it would affect PSP's ability to respond to major incidents like the Blooming Grove Shooting. Public release would provide detailed information on

PSP's tactics and strategy for handling a similar situation in the future, and as stated above, would provide a roadmap to individuals with nefarious intentions regarding PSP's tactical and strategic operations, personnel capabilities, equipment capabilities, communication capabilities, and incident command management. Therefore, the information is also exempt pursuant to Section 708(b)(2) of the RTKL.

13. PSP has also redacted information in Appendix A related to a "Hot Wash." A Hot Wash is a facilitated discussion held (by the lead agency) upon the conclusion of an incident (labor disturbances, civil disorders, or any event to generate more than routine patrol coverage) from each responding agency head. The hot wash is designed to capture feedback about any issues, concerns, or proposed action recommendations that responding agencies may have about the incident. It allows each agency to provide a self-assessment of their response coupled with an overall observation from all involved.

14. The Hot Wash formed the basis of the entire Report including the sections "Primary Areas for Improvement" and "Action Recommendations Identified." The information in these sections is based on the discussions at the Hot Wash. Therefore, this information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Sections 708(b)(2) and (b)(10)(i) of the RTKL.

15. Furthermore, redactions have also been made to Appendix B: Improvement Plan. The information contained in this section of the Report contains step-by-step actions that PSP will take to improve upon the issues identified at the Hot Wash and in the "Primary Areas for Improvement" and "Action Recommendations Identified" in the report. Thus, based on the above, this information is exempt from disclosure Sections 708(b)(2) and (b)(10)(i) of the RTKL.

16. In addition to the above reasons given for exemption of the redacted information, public disclosure of this information will also hinder the ability of PSP and other law enforcement agencies from performing self-evaluations after a major incident as information that has been determined to be law enforcement sensitive will become public. This, in and of itself, will jeopardize or threaten a public safety activity because necessary feedback may not be given because of concerns that the information will become public.

17. Information has also been redacted pursuant to the criminal investigation exemption in the RTKL. The redactions made on pages 6, 12, and 13 contain witness names, information related to sealed search warrants, and statements made by the suspect at the time of his capture. All of this information was used during the criminal investigation into the actions of the suspect. Therefore, this information is exempt from disclosure pursuant to Section 708(b)(16) of the RTKL.

18. In regard to redactions made on page 31 of the Report, information contained in the first full paragraph is exempt from disclosure pursuant to the criminal investigation exemption. This information was extracted from PSP Incident Report No. N06-1247916 and was placed in this "For Official Use Only" Report. This information pertains to potential criminal activity that is currently being investigated. Therefore, this information is exempt from disclosure pursuant to Section 708(b)(16) of the RTKL.

19. The additional redaction made on page 31 is exempt from disclosure pursuant to the public safety and predecisional exemptions in the RTKL. The redacted information contains recommendations related to how PSP will purchase supplies in future major incidents similar to the Blooming Grove Incident. This is an operational decision within PSP. Therefore, this information is exempt from disclosure pursuant to Sections 708(b)(2) and (b)(10)(i).

20. Redactions have also been made on page 20 of the Report regarding information related PSP's Bureau of Emergency and Special Operations (BESO). These redactions were made pursuant to Section 708(b)(2) of the RTKL. BESO operates to provide the Department with an additional means of dealing with high-risk, special emergency, or other unusual situations where special training in communications, tactics, and the use of special equipment is desirable. The redactions to this section were made because it details the strategic and tactical information which is critical to BESO's mission. This section also provides information on BESO's capabilities and the technology that BESO deployed in the Blooming Grove Incident. Public availability of this information would affect BESO's ability to operate because the general public would be aware of BESO's capabilities and criminal could attempt to circumvent BESO's tactics thereby avoiding apprehension.


21. Requester has been provided as much material as possible without jeopardizing public safety or would reflect predecisional deliberations.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT, UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY.

SGT. Carl J. Veach  
Sergeant Carl J. Veach  
Bureau of Criminal Investigation  
Pennsylvania State Police

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME on this 1<sup>st</sup> day of December, 2015, to certify which witness my hand and seal.

Carolee A. Fernback



LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

PSP – BLOOMING GROVE SHOOTING

9/12/14 – 10/30/14

R04-0942492

# **AFTER ACTION REPORT/IMPROVEMENT PLAN**





LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

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## HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

1. The title of this document is After Action Report/Improvement Plan for PSP – Blooming Grove Shooting.
2. The information gathered in this AAR/IP is classified as For Official Use Only (FOUO) and should be handled as sensitive information not to be disclosed. This document should be safeguarded, handled, transmitted, and stored in accordance with appropriate security directives. Reproduction of this document, in whole or in part, without prior approval from Pennsylvania State Police is prohibited.
3. At a minimum, the attached materials will be disseminated only on a need-to-know basis and when unattended, will be stored in a locked container or area offering sufficient protection against theft, compromise, inadvertent access, and unauthorized disclosure in the Troop Staff Services Section or in a location in a Bureau/Office at the discretion of the Bureau/Office Director.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

*Synopsis of the incident/special event to include date, time, location, details of the chain of events leading up to the incident, the initial response or the beginning of PSP involvement, if help was requested by another jurisdiction or agency, the outcome of the incident/event to include: a description of any injuries or fatalities, description of arrests and the names of persons arrested, description of all property damage, including damage to Department equipment along with an expenditure of funds and the recovery from any possible claims against PSP stemming from the incident/event. A description of the circumstances and status of any subsequent major investigations stemming from the incident/event should also be included in this section.*

On 9/12/14, a tragedy occurred at the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Troop R, Blooming Grove Station. Two members were ambushed by gunfire from the wood line outside the Blooming Grove Station, resulting in the death of Corporal Bryon K. Dickson and seriously injuring Trooper Alex Douglass. This marks a dark moment in PSP history. The details that follow provide a summary leading up to obtaining an arrest warrant for the actor (Eric Frein) and his apprehension on 10/30/2014.

On 09/12/14, Corporal Bryon K. Dickson of the Pennsylvania State Police Troop R Blooming Grove Patrol Unit was working the 1500-2300 shift. Corporal Dickson was working his shift in full uniform and was operating a marked patrol unit; car #R04-2. At approximately 2250 hours, Corporal Dickson was exiting the front door of the Blooming Grove Station towards his vehicle, which was parked in front of the station. As Corporal Dickson exited the front door, he immediately dropped to the ground in front of the door where he remained motionless. These actions were observed via the Blooming Grove Station's surveillance system.

On 09/12/14 at approximately 2245 hours, Police Communications Operator Nicole Palmer arrived at PSP Blooming Grove Station to work her 2300-0700 shift. Palmer entered the building through the front door and proceeded to the Communication Room. Palmer indicated that she observed Corporal Dickson walking through the lobby towards the front door. Palmer heard a noise, which sounded like a firecracker and looked out the window to the lobby towards the front door and observed Corporal Dickson on the ground. Palmer exited the Communication Room and walked into the lobby. While in the lobby, she saw a cloud of white residue on the floor. She exited the lobby and heard another noise, which again sounded like a firecracker. Palmer then opened the exterior door and approached Corporal Dickson who was motionless on the ground. Palmer asked Corporal Dickson what happened and he informed her that he had been shot and needed help. Palmer returned from outside to the lobby and attempted to use a telephone to call 911. Palmer was unsuccessful, because the lobby phone does not have the capability of making outgoing telephone calls. Palmer returned to Corporal Dickson and he asked her to drag him inside but she was unable to. Palmer re-entered PSP Blooming Grove Station and called for assistance.

On 09/12/14, Trooper Alex Douglass of the Pennsylvania State Police, Troop R, Blooming Grove Patrol Unit was working a 2300-0700 shift. Trooper Douglass was in

full uniform. Trooper Douglass, at the time of the shooting of Corporal Dickson, was in the lower parking lot of the PSP Blooming Grove Station. Trooper Douglass was observed on video surveillance approaching the front of the building walking towards Corporal Dickson who remained motionless on the ground. As Trooper Douglass approached Corporal Dickson, he looked into the lobby at which time he fell to the ground. Trooper Douglass was able to crawl into the lobby. As Trooper Douglass laid on the lobby floor, Trooper William Fells of PSP Blooming Grove Patrol Unit exited the secure door and entered the lobby where he retrieved Trooper Douglass and brought him into the secured portion of the PSP Blooming Grove Station.

On 09/12/14, members of PSP Blooming Grove Patrol Unit executed a rescue attempt of Corporal Dickson. Members utilized a marked patrol SUV and drove to the front parking lot. The vehicle was used as a shield to protect members while they brought Corporal Dickson into the PSP Blooming Grove Station. Members of the PSP Blooming Grove Patrol Unit began to render medical assistance immediately to Corporal Dickson and Trooper Douglass. Trooper Douglass was subsequently transported via Medi-Vac to Geisinger CMC Hospital in Scranton, PA where he underwent emergency surgery for a gunshot wound to the pelvic region. Corporal Dickson was subsequently declared deceased at the scene by the Pike County Coroner's Office.

On 09/13/14, Dr. Gary Ross, Chief Medical Examiner of Lackawanna County, performed an autopsy on Corporal Dickson. Dr. Ross ruled the cause of death as multiple gunshot wounds and the manner of death as Homicide.

On 09/13/14, a line search was performed by members of various law enforcement agencies in the wooded area across from the PSP Blooming Grove Station. During the search, Trooper George Murphy of the PSP Dunmore Station, located four (4) spent .308 caliber cartridge casings marked AFF88. The casings were located in an area consistent with the location where the shooter would have positioned himself to shoot Corporal Dickson and Trooper Douglass. The Troop R, Dunmore, Forensic Services Unit recovered three (3) projectiles from the front section of the PSP Blooming Grove Station, specifically the entrance.

On 09/15/14, the PSP Blooming Grove Station received a telephone call from (b)(16) [REDACTED], who indicated that he was a resident of the Blue Heron Development, located in Blooming Grove Twp., Pike County. On 09/15/14 at approximately 0830 hours, (b)(16) reported that he was walking his dog through a wooded area in Blue Heron Development, he observed a vehicle slightly submerged in a retention pond. (b)(16) related that he thought the vehicle might have been stuck. (b)(16) related that he approached the vehicle, which he described as a green Jeep. (b)(16) related that as he got closer to the vehicle he did not see anyone inside. (b)(16) indicated that the Jeep was on private property and he was suspicious because the vehicle was abandoned with its windows open. (b)(16) subsequently called 911 and reported the suspicious vehicle.

On 09/15/14, Trooper Jeremy Carroll, of the PSP Blooming Grove Patrol Unit, responded to the Blue Heron Development, proceeded to the area, and located the vehicle that was slightly submerged in the retention pond. Trooper Carroll indicated that he observed a chain barrier covered with PVC piping that had been damaged. This chain barrier was there to prevent access to the area of the retention pond. The vehicle appeared to have traveled from the area where the damage occurred. Trooper Carroll proceeded to the pond and observed a green Jeep Cherokee Sport with PA registration DJV-5220.

A records check indicated that the green Jeep Cherokee Sport was registered to E. Michael and Deborah Frein, who had a Canadensis, PA, mailing address, which is located in Barrett Twp., Monroe County. An NCIC check of the green Jeep Cherokee Sport bearing PA registration DJV-5220 revealed that the vehicle had not been entered as stolen.

On 09/15/14, Trooper First Class Mulvey and Trooper First Class Orlando applied for a Search Warrant for the green Jeep Cherokee Sport registered to E. Michael and Deborah Frein. The Search Warrant was approved by Pike County District Attorney Ray Tonkin. Due to investigative reasons, the Search Warrant was sealed and issued by Court of Common Pleas Judge Gregory Chelak.

On 09/15/14 at 1856 hours, Trooper First Class Mulvey and Trooper First Class Orlando and members of the Troop R, Dunmore, Forensic Services Unit executed the Search Warrant on the green Jeep Cherokee Sport registered to E. Michael and Deborah Frein at Rays Auto Repair in Milford, PA. During the search, Trooper James Hitchcock of the Troop R, Dunmore, Forensic Services Unit located two spent .308 cartridge casings marked AFF88 under the passenger side rear seat. Also located during the Search Warrant was a valid PA driver's license for the Defendant, a Social Security Card for the Defendant, a PA Game Commission Range Permit for the Defendant, camouflage face paint, flash lights, a black hooded sweatshirt, two empty rifle cases, military gear, and various information concerning foreign embassies. The address on the Defendant's PA driver's license was 308 Seneca Lane, Canadensis, PA, which is located in Barrett Twp., Monroe County.

On 09/16/14, ballistics expert Corporal Joseph Gober compared the .308 cartridge casings recovered from the woodline across from the PSP Blooming Grove Station to the .308 cartridge casings located in the Jeep Cherokee Sport at the PSP Wyoming Regional Laboratory. The conclusion was that the tool marks on all casings recovered from the scene were a match to the casings recovered in the Jeep Cherokee Sport. According to Corporal Gober, the individual characteristics from the firing pin impression, ejector, and extractor marks of the cartridge casings recovered in the woods across from PSP Blooming Grove Station were a match to the cartridge casings recovered within the Defendant's vehicle.



On 09/16/14, Trooper First Class Mulvey and Trooper First Class Orlando received approval from Monroe County Assistant District Attorney Michael Mancuso for a Search Warrant for the Defendant's residence. On 09/14/14, a Search Warrant for the Defendant's residence was issued by District Justice Michael Muth.

On 09/16/14, members of the Pennsylvania State Police proceeded to the Defendant's residence which is listed on his valid PA driver's license and executed the Search Warrant. During the Search Warrant process, the Defendant's father, E. Michael Frein, indicated that two firearms were missing from the residence. He described one of the missing weapons as an AK-47 and the other missing weapon was a .308 rifle with a scope. During the Search Warrant process, the Defendant's mother, Deborah Frein, indicated that the green Jeep Cherokee Sport bearing PA registration DJV-5220 registered in her and her husband's name was utilized by the Defendant for the past two years as his personal vehicle. During the Search Warrant, members of the PSP located fourteen (14) AFF88 spent cartridge casings in the garage, which were produced by the same manufacturer as the cartridge casings located at the scene and in the Defendant's vehicle. While searching the Defendant's residence, members of the PSP located a pipe bomb and a book titled Sniper Training and Employment. During the Search Warrant, members of the PSP seized various computer devices.


On 09/16/14 Trooper Edward McCarthy and Trooper Carl Ives, both of the PSP Blooming Grove Crime Unit, interviewed E. Michael Frein (Father of the Defendant) and he related that he was a retired Major in the United States Army with 28 years of service. E. Michael Frein related that he had trained the Defendant in shooting skills; that the Defendant was a member of the rifle team in high school; the Defendant was a better shooter than himself (E. Michael Frein); and the Defendant "doesn't miss." Trooper Ives showed E. Michael Frein a photo of the black rifle case that was located in the Defendant's vehicle, and he related that the black rifle resembled a case that belonged to him or the Defendant.

On 09/16/14, Troopers Clark, Mulvey, and Orlando obtained an arrest warrant from District Court 60-3-02 in Pike County, Pennsylvania, for the Defendant charging him with Murder of the First Degree, Attempted Murder in the First Degree, Criminal Homicide of a Law Enforcement Officer, Attempted Criminal Homicide of a Law Enforcement Officer, and other related offenses under Title 18 of the PA Crimes Code.


During the course of this investigation, numerous Search Warrants were executed; evidence was recovered; and numerous interviews conducted to assist in the apprehension of Eric Frein.

For a period of 48 days, an extensive search of Monroe and Pike Counties (Comprised of local, state, and federal officials) for Eric Frein took place.

On 10/30/14 (Day 48), the US Marshal Service, as part of the daily search were instructed to search an area near an abandoned airport (Birchwood Pocono Airport in Pocono Twp., Monroe County). Upon searching this area, the US Marshall Service discovered an individual who was identified as Eric Frein. Eric Frein was subsequently taken into custody without incident and arrested for the acts committed. Eric Frein was transported to the PSP Blooming Grove Station and subsequently interviewed. During the interview, Frein related the following information: (b)(16)



The days following the arrest, search warrants were executed on the airplane hangar at the Birchwood Pocono Airport in Pocono Twp., Monroe County and on the computer hardware and software seized from the Airplane Hangar. A key piece of evidence retrieved from a thumb drive was a letter addressed to Eric Frein's Mom and Dad. In the letter, Frein explains his actions behind the crimes he committed. (b)(16)



The details that follow are a general synopsis of all Department segments within the Incident Command System. The report is compartmentalized into each section so the reader is able to find the specific area of interest. In doing so, each section was completed and reviewed by their respective Bureau/Division Directors. Each section was able to readily identify major strengths, areas for improvement, and action recommendations to assist with future incidents of this nature. All areas for improvement that need further follow-up are listed in the Improvement Plan and will be assigned to the appropriate organizational segment for completion.

## Major Strengths

The major strengths identified during this incident are as follows:


- The Command Staff's decision to activate the PSP Incident Management Teams (IMTs) to support positions in the Command and General Staff of the Incident Command System (ICS) allowed for structure, organization, and accountability, which aided in the success of the operations mission. Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) IMT augmented PSP IMT members.

- The support from outside agency partners (Local, State, and Federal) was exceptional in providing manpower to assist with the search. Additionally, equipment and intelligence sharing sources were provided to greatly assist with this manhunt. These support agencies were aided by volunteer organizations such as the Red Cross and various organizations from Monroe and Pike Counties.
- Due to the seriousness of the individual at large, it was determined that the need for vest carriers/ballistic plates (previously on order, but not yet delivered) be dispersed to the scene (Staging Area) to ensure each member would be equipped with the highest level of protection while searching for the suspect. The coordination between the Domestic Security Division and Atlantic Tactical representatives was outstanding. Atlantic Tactical representatives met the Department's request and arranged for the vest carriers/ballistic plates be delivered to the staging area.

### **Primary Areas for Improvement**

During the course of the incident, several opportunities for improvement in Troop R, Blooming Grove Station ability to respond to the incident were identified. The primary areas for improvement, including recommendations, are as follows:

(b)(2) & (b)(10)(i)



## SECTION 1: INCIDENT OVERVIEW

*Information in the Incident Overview should be "structured data"—written as a list rather than in paragraph form—in order to facilitate preparation of other parts of the AAR/IP, maintain consistency within AAR/IPs, and facilitate the analysis of AAR/IPs for program reporting.*

### Incident Details

**Incident Name**

PSP – Blooming Grove Shooting

**Incident Number**

R04-0942492

**Incident Start Date**

September 12, 2014

**Incident End Date**

October 30, 2014

**Duration**

The incident lasted 48 consecutive days.

**Location**

Latitude and Longitude: 41 23 14 70 / -75 07 54 99

Physical address: 434 SR402

Township /Borough/ City: Blooming Grove Township

County and State: Pike County/PA

**Incident Command Structure (ICS)** – Yes.

**Incident Commander** – Captain James Degnan

**Deputy Incident Commander** – Captain Doug Burig

**Operations Section Chief** – Captain Adam Kosheba

**Finance Section Chief** – Sergeant Gregory Bernard

**Planning Section Chief** – Captain Garret L. Rain

**Logistics Section Chief** – Lieutenant Daniel J. Hines

**Timeline of Incident** *(Time line of major events as the incident transpired).*

Date/Time	Description of Event (Timeline)
9/12/14 - 2255 hours	The Pennsylvania State Police at Blooming Grove was ambushed by gunfire from the wood line. Corporal Bryon K. Dickson was fatally wounded and Trooper Alex Douglass was severely injured during the incident.
9/12/14 - 2330 hours	Command Post established at the Blooming Grove Baptist Church located at SR402 and Blooming Grove Road, Blooming Grove Township, Pike County.
9/13/14 - 0904 hours	A search of the wooded area across the street from the barracks was conducted. During the search, four (4) .308 caliber cartridge casings marked AFF88 were located. The casings were transported to PSP Wyoming Regional Lab for analysis.
9/14/14 - 0700 hours	State Troopers (PA, NJ, NY), along with Federal Agents, begin to conduct a massive search of the woods around the Blooming Grove Barracks.
9/14/14 - 1500 hours	The Incident Command Post was relocated to PSP Blooming Grove Barracks. Blooming Grove Baptist Church was then established as the Staging Area for Tactical Groups.
9/15/14 - 1130 hours	(b)(16), a resident of Blue Herron Development, contacted PSP Blooming Grove Station and related he observed an unoccupied, abandoned Jeep bearing Pennsylvania registration DJV-5220 partially submerged in a retention pond in the Blue Heron Development, Blooming Grove Township, Pike County.
9/15/14 - 2035 hours	A sealed Search Warrant was obtained for the Jeep and executed. (b)(16)
9/16/14 - 0009 hours	(b)(16)

Date/Time	Description of Event (Timeline)
9/16/14 - 0148 hours	A sealed Search Warrant was obtained and executed at Eric Frein's residence located at 308 Seneca Lane, Barrett Township, Monroe County. (b)(16) [REDACTED]
9/17/14 - 1600-2000 hours	The viewing of Corporal Bryon K. Dickson was held at the Marywood University Rotunda located at 2300 Adams Avenue, Scranton City, Lackawanna County.
9/17/14 - 2200 hours	The Incident Command Post/Staging was moved from the PSP Blooming Grove Station to the Pike County Communications Center located at 135 Pike County Boulevard, Lords Valley, PA.
9/18/14 - 1000 hours	Funeral Services for Corporal Bryon K. Dickson were held at the Saint Peter's Cathedral in Scranton City with internment services at the Dunmore Cemetery in Dunmore Borough, Lackawanna County.
9/18/14 - 1230 hours	A second sealed Search Warrant for Frein's residence located at 308 Seneca Lane, Barrett Township, was obtained. (b)(16) [REDACTED]
9/18/14 - 1246 hours	PSP SERT located a campsite in the woods northwest of the area where the Jeep was located. An AK47, 30 round magazine, and a camouflage bag containing various articles were seized.
9/18/14 - 1405 hours	Electronic Surveillance of Eric Frein's cellular phone indicated he was in Price Township, Monroe County, at approximately 1400 hours. The location provided was approximately three miles from the defendant's residence.
9/19/14 - 2200 hours	Barrett Township Volunteer Fire Company, Monroe County, was established as the Staging Area for all agencies assisting in the investigation other than the tactical units.
9/22/14 - 0700 hours	Forward Tactical Operations Center (FTOC) was moved from the Blooming Grove Baptist Church to an airstrip located in the area of Laurel Drive and Kozak Road, Barrett Township, Monroe County, PA.
9/23/14 - 1000 hours	PSP locates in a wooded area, within five miles of Frein's residence, discarded items to include Serbian cigarette packs.

<b>Date/Time</b>	<b>Description of Event (Timeline)</b>
<b>9/29/14 - 1254 hours</b>	FBI Albany locates a camping area. Two pipe bombs, ammunition, additional clothing, gear, and Eric Frein's checkbook were located at the camping area, which is located approximately 700 meters from the original cell phone ping.
<b>9/30/14 – 1000 hours</b>	PSP locates in a wooded area near the Monroe and Pike county border, two functional pipe bombs at a remote campsite. PSP also seized clothing and food, including tuna fish, ramen noodles, and about 90 rounds of ammunition for the .308-caliber rifle.
<b>10/1/14 - 0700 hours</b>	Staging Area relocated from the Barrett Township Fire Department to the Barrett Township Elementary Center located at Box 2402 SR390, Cresco, PA.
<b>10/30/14 - 1809 hours</b>	US Marshals Special Operations Group take Eric Frein into custody at the Birchwood Pocono Airport, Pocono Township, Monroe County, PA. Frein was transported to PSP Blooming Grove Station, Pike County, for processing.
<b>10/31/14 - 0900 hours</b>	District Justice Shannon Muir of District Court 60-3-02 arraigned Frein at the Pike County Courthouse. Frein was committed to the Pike County Jail without bail.
<b>10/31/14 - 0800 hours</b>	A Search Warrant was executed at the airplane hangar at the Birchwood Pocono Airport, Pocono Township, Monroe County. During the search, firearms, ammunition, military gear, survival equipment, computer equipment, and other various articles that Frein used during this incident were seized.
<b>11/12/14 - 0900 hours</b>	Preliminary hearing scheduled at the Pike County Courthouse in front of District Magistrate Shannon Muir. Hearing was continued until 12/9/14 at 0900 hours.
<b>12/9/14 - 0900 hours</b>	Preliminary hearing scheduled at the Pike County Courthouse in front of District Magistrate Shannon Muir.
<b>1/5/15 – 0900 hours</b>	A Preliminary hearing was held at the Pike County Courthouse. All criminal charges were bound over to the Court of Common Pleas.

## **Participating Organizations**

### **Number of Participants**

*List the total number of each of the following incident participants, as applicable:*

Enlisted Members/Commissioned Officers: 2,984

Specialized Units: PSP

Special Emergency Response Team (SERT)

Hazardous Device Explosive Section (HDES)

Bureau of Criminal Investigation-Intelligence

Bureau of Criminal Investigation-Tactical

Bureau of Criminal Investigation-Fugitive

Bureau of Criminal Investigation-Drug Law

Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center (PaCIC)

Other Police Departments (list the Department(s) name)

Barrett Township Police Department

Berks County Sheriff's Office

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, Explosives

Connecticut State Police (K9)

Department of Conservation of Natural Resources

Department of Corrections

Department of Homeland Security

Derry Township Police Department (K9)

Eastern Pike Regional Police Department

Easton City Police Department (SWAT)

Erie Police Department

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Greencastle Police Department (K9)

Harrisburg Police Department (K9)

Hazleton Police Department

Lancaster County Sheriff's (K9)

Lehigh Police Department

New Jersey State Police

New York City Police Department

New York State Police

PA Fish and Boat Commission



Office of Attorney General  
PA Game Commission  
Pittsburgh Police Department  
Scranton City Police (SWAT)  
Southeastern PA Transportation Authority (K9)  
Stafford County Sheriff's Office (K9)  
Temple University Police Department (K9)  
United States Marshal Service  
United States Border Patrol/Customs  
Wilkes Barre City Police Department  
York County Sheriff's Department

**PSP HAD 2,984 ENLISTED (NON-COMMISSIONED/COMMISSIONED OFFICERS) PARTICIPATE OVER THIS 48 DAY PERIOD.**

**THE TOTAL NUMBER OF MEMBERS RESPONDING FROM EACH ASSISTING AGENCY VARIED ON A DAILY BASIS. THEREFORE, A FINAL NUMBER IS NOT PROVIDED.**

## SECTION 2: ANALYSIS OF INCIDENT

*This section of the report reviews the performance, capabilities, activities, and tasks which occurred during the incident. The major issues addressed in this section shall also include and expand upon the annotated issues in the Executive Summary under Major Strengths and Primary Areas of Improvement. All issues identifying an "Area for Improvement" shall be listed and addressed on the Improvement Plan. (Appendix B)*

### **Incident Command System**

#### **Summary**

The Domestic Security Division led Incident Management Team (IMT) functions during this incident. PSP IMT members were augmented by PEMA's IMT. IMT personnel provided event-planning, logistics, finance, and provided staging area management. IMT personnel provided event management support at: Pike County EOC, Barrett Township Staging, and the Forward Tactical Operations Center (FTOC).

#### **Major Strengths Identified**

1. The IMT specific training previously held allowed PSP IMT members to draft professional and effective Incident Action Plans.
2. The coordination and accountability of the Uniform Division worked extremely well due to the use of the "T" card and other tracking systems.
3. The procurement of additional supplies was expedited and accomplished quickly.
4. The ability to house, feed, equip, and support the operational staff was a product of effective logistics. By establishing a centralized staging location for resources (food, equipment, vests, communications, etc.) close to the hot-zone made distribution and assignment of resources more efficient.

#### **Areas for Improvement**

(b)(2) & (b)(10)(i)

(b)(2) & (b)(10)(i)

Action Recommendations Identified

(b)(2) & (b)(10)(i)

## **Bureau of Criminal Investigation – Intelligence**

### **Summary**

The Intelligence Branch included both tactical and analytical components. Tactical Intelligence members participated in interviews, conducted surveillance, and performed both wooded and residential searches. The analytical component consisted of members from PSP and several federal law enforcement agencies including the FBI and ATF. Intelligence analysts responded to over 350 requests for information (RFIs), created maps, provided timelines, and conducted research to assist the various operational segments of the investigation.

### **Major Strengths Identified**

1. Excellent intra-agency coordination that was facilitated by pre-established relationships.
2. Access to Federal Government resources through ongoing partnerships assisted with Intelligence gathering.
3. The ability of Intelligence personnel to perform diverse functions was exceptional.
4. The ability of PaCIC analysts to effectively respond to varied requests from multiple agencies and PSP segments aided in this investigation.

### **Areas for Improvement**


(b)(2) & (b)(10)(i)

### **Action Recommendations Identified**



(b)(2) & (b)(10)(i)

**Bureau of Emergency and Special Operations (BESO)**

**Summary**



**Major Strengths Identified**

1. The Standardization of PSP helicopter fleet to enable 24/7 coverage and rotation of PSP flight crews was instrumental in completing the mission.
2. PSP SERT members training and experience in wooded terrain operations as well as dedication and ability to work in all conditions (rain or shine, cold or hot, daylight or darkness) aided in the search. (b)(2)  
A black rectangular redaction box covering several lines of text following item 2.
3. The skills and experience by most outside tactical teams who integrated well into tactical operations assignments, scheduling and mission planning/execution was a success. US Customs and Border Patrol/BORTAC, ATF SRT, US Marshals SOG, NJSP SWAT, and NY State Police K9 were all excellent partners and skilled operators. Those agencies subscribed to the Unified Tactical Command Structure in place and PSP were in Tactical Command.
4. The cooperation and coordination of all agencies air assets (fixed wing and rotorcraft) aided in the search for Eric Frein. (b)(2)  
A black rectangular redaction box covering several lines of text following item 4.
5. The support of the American Red Cross was outstanding and a critical component to the field operators deployed for such a protracted incident.

Areas for Improvement

(b)(2) & (b)(10)(i)



Action Recommendations Identified

(b)(2) & (b)(10)(i)



(b)(2) & (b)(10)(i)

**Bureau of Communications and Information Services**

**Summary**

The mission of the Bureau of Communications and Information Services (BCIS) was to provide multi-agency voice communications via the 800Mhz OpenSky radio system, the PSP backup VHF system, and cellular telephones. Additionally, the 800Mhz OpenSky radio system provided data support to all agencies using the data segment of the OpenSky radio system to MDTs and data via the PA Statewide Radio Network (PA STARNet), as well as common carrier LTE data. Finally, BCIS provided command and control functions through the use of PSP's Mobile Command Posts (MCP), and leveraging the Department's information technology resources, such as Mobile Office (MO) and Enterprise Network resources. BCIS was also to ensure radio communications interoperability using PSP STARNet network resources, tactical interoperability, portable/mobile radio use, and radio capacity and talk group efficiency.

**Major Strengths Identified**

1. Personnel experience, expertise, perseverance, flexibility, and tireless effort were key: BCIS personnel mobilized rapidly and with the necessary equipment to lay the communications and command framework that would continually be improved throughout the life of the incident. BCIS personnel had the right skill set and exceptional work ethic that helped the Department overcome significant adversity.
2. The availability and reliability of equipment (MCP, Special event portables, base station radios, Cell on Wheels, command outrigger) aided in the operation. BCIS personnel had the foresight to have acquired the necessary equipment to successfully execute the Bureau's mission months or years in advance.
3. Simplicity of PSP statewide talk group use/management: Earlier in 2014, BCIS implemented a statewide talk group in the 800MHz radio system (PSP\_SWD). This talk group was programmed into every PSP radio and provided a common




channel for personnel arriving from Troops and Bureaus across the State. It provided situational awareness to the entire agency throughout the incident and gave advance notice of mission requirements for personnel scheduled to arrive in subsequent waves.

4. The implementation of a single point of contact for communications/technology issues enabled command personnel to focus on operational and tactical issues without the necessity of dealing with separate Bureaus. BCIS took the lead for these issues with the full support of the Bureau of Information Technology (BIT). Work between BIT and BCIS was seamless with both Bureaus providing unprecedented complimentary expertise and cooperation. BIT provided MIFI devices for internet access and emplaced approximately 15 PSP networked computers and peripherals at the Pike 911 Command Post and an additional 15 PSP networked computers and peripherals at the Barrett Elementary Center Staging Area. BIT coordinated for the installation of PSP dedicated circuits at both locations.

As the incident progressed, PSP became highly organized into operational segments that facilitated efficient use of personnel and resources. The use of the Incident Command System model provided a familiar framework for all personnel involved. Publishing the Incident Action Plans daily was instrumental in keeping personnel apprised of key staffing positions.

**Areas for Improvement**

(b)(2) & (b)(10)(i)



**Actions Recommendations Identified**

(b)(2) & (b)(10)(i)

**Public Information Office**

**Summary**

The Public Information Office (PIO) was responsible for the daily interaction with media, local community leaders, the Incident Commander, Deputy Commissioner of Operations and the Commissioner. Additionally, the PIO was responsible for organizing and preparing for news briefs, talking points, and writing press releases.

**Major Strengths Identified**

1. All Troop Public Information Officers stepped up and agreed to assist by staffing the Command Post. In some cases, members traveled hours to get there from Troops H, J, L, and K.
2. The direction of media to one organization, PSP was beneficial.
3. The ability to access PSP network computers and designate a computer for PIO use only assisted with our responsibilities.
4. Designated a media staging area and a consistent location for press briefings allowed for information to be disseminated.
5. Media availability from a PIO or the Press Secretary, via e-mail, was constant, which included weekends and holidays.

6. The operations aspect of the PIO position was handled very well. The use of a media group email list to release information instead of individual phone calls and the mass email was very efficient, well organized, and it saved on time and limited confusion.
7. The periodical press conferences were organized and kept the media and the community calm. The signing off and on PIO messages to the media was well done. This kept the media informed of who needed to be contacted during certain times.

**Areas for Improvement**

(b)(2) & (b)(10)(i)

**Action Recommendations Identified**

(b)(2) & (b)(10)(i)

(b)(2) & (b)(10)(i)

### **Field Members Response**

#### **Summary**

In an effort to support this operation's mission, all Troops and Bureaus within the Department were asked to provide members to assist with the search for Eric Frein. The responsibilities for these members varied, but included: establishment and maintenance of the outer perimeter, identification and processing items of evidentiary value, and efforts to identify and locate the suspect. Additionally, members were assigned to the Staging Area to assist with the issuance of equipment and administrative duties. A total of 166 responses were submitted from the field.

#### **Major Strengths Identified**

1. Once the Incident Command System was set up the organizational structure and guidance seemed to fall in place, allowing the resources assigned be utilized to their fullest potential.
2. The Department ensured that adequate manpower and resources such as water, food, and equipment (body armor, night vision, thermal imaging and first aid supplies) were made available throughout the operation.
3. Interagency cooperation, their resources, dedication, and treating the incident as if it happened within their agency proved to be invaluable.
4. Making the community aware by disseminating information to the public helped gain invaluable community support. The community support coupled with various volunteer agencies throughout Monroe and Pike counties exceeded expectations.
5. The relentless dedication of all members to go above and beyond was extraordinary, as no one wanted to leave until the suspect was apprehended.

Areas for Improvement

(b)(2) & (b)(10)(i)



Action Recommendations Identified

(b)(2) & (b)(10)(i)



(b)(2) & (b)(10)(i)

## Section 3: Conclusion

*This section is a conclusion for the entire document. It provides an overall summary to the report. It should include the demonstrated capabilities, lessons learned, major recommendations, and a summary of what steps should be taken to ensure that the concluding results will help to further refine plans, policies, procedures, and training for this type of incident. Subheadings are not necessary and the level of detail in this section does not need to be as comprehensive as that in the Executive Summary.*

In summary, the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) was successful in the execution of its primary mission; the apprehension of Eric Frein. In addition, there were no significant injuries to law enforcement and the community. For a period of 48 days, PSP and assisting agencies were steadfast in tracking down the suspect. Additional key factors were the collaboration with inter-agencies, intelligence gathering, specialized equipment, and manpower commitment.

Throughout this report, Department Leads from all Organizational Segments provided summaries of their involvement within the Incident Command Structure. Department Leads identified major strengths, areas for improvement, and action recommendations. The Improvement Plan documents the areas to build upon for future incidents of this nature, and addresses policy revisions, to further enhance operations in future events.

For a period of 48 days, there were no unmet needs from the Department. However, due to the intensity and length of time involved, there were several PSP vehicle crashes, minor injuries sustained during the search, communication issues, and missing equipment reported.

There were 12 PSP vehicle crashes that occurred during this incident. All vehicles sustained minor damage and no injuries were reported. Causal factors were attributed to driver error and environmental issues.

During the search for Eric Frein, there were 42 injuries reported. There were 25 Incident Only and 17 Medical Only Claims. The members that reported medical claims, eight members lost time from work. Because of these crashes and injuries, the Department shall continue to stress the importance of safety at all event briefings.


During this incident, communication issues existed with the 800 MHz radio. This was a result of the wooded terrain and remote location of the search. The OpenSky system was operating outside its designed parameter's. The OpenSky system was being used off of main roads in rough terrain and in a local Police Department's jurisdiction which allowed for the poor coverage. The problem was mitigated by the use of two COWs (Cell on Wheels) and 160 Motorola VHF portable radios networked into OpenSky with a simulcast VHF overlay. Cellular telephones, regardless of carrier, had similar coverage issues as the 800MHz OpenSky radio. The Bureau of Information Technology (BIT) coordinated with Verizon to provide a COW at the Staging Area, which significantly improved cellular, and LTE coverage for operations at that location.

As noted, these issues were corrected during the incident; however, contingency plans for poor coverage areas (remote places) should be in place, prior to any large-scale event.

(b)(16)



The estimated initial personnel costs for overtime for this event and miscellaneous expenses totaled in excess of \$10,000,000. All inquiries for specific totals and expenditures shall be referred to the Bureau of Staff Services, Fiscal Division. The name of the operation was "PSP – Blooming Grove Shooting". The coding for this detail was Cost Center: 2099999999 and Internal Order Number 2080100053. In simplifying data collection efforts, all PSP – Blooming Grove Shooting expenditures were tracked through the SAP system. Supervisory personnel used the Bureau of Criminal Investigation, Domestic Security Division's Credit Card and individual Troop Credit Cards in making miscellaneous payments/purchases to assist members with the search ( e.g. equipment, outer wear, repellant spray, administrative items, etc.) All credit card statements were reconciled and validated. (b)(2) & (b)(10)(i)



Historically, this incident marks the first of its kind, where a PSP Station was attacked by an individual, resulting in the death of Corporal Bryon K. Dickson and seriously injuring Trooper Alex Douglass. The team effort put forth by PSP and outside agencies (Listed on Page 8 of this report) displayed unwavering dedication to law enforcement and what each agency represents. The community support along with local businesses, as well as private entities (Red Cross and various organizations from Monroe and Pike Counties) were outstanding, as they provided food and refreshments to aid in nourishing everyone who was working these long extensive hours.



This After Action Report/Improvement Plan describes a major mobilization of personnel and resources for an extended period of time, as well as the challenges that goes along with such deployment. All personnel, who participated in this tragic event, have demonstrated the ability of the Department to adapt to changing circumstances, as they unfolded and the confidence of its members to perform at the highest level.

The selfless devotion to duty by all members enhanced operational support and ensured mission accomplishment. As a result, it is fitting that all members who participated in this operation be honored with the Commissioner's Significant Operation Service Award.

## APPENDIX A: HOT WASH WORKSHEET

PSP-Blooming Grove Shooting  
*Pennsylvania State Police Hot Wash*  
January 28, 2015

### Overview

- On 01/28/15 at Department Headquarters (DHQ), the Bureau of Criminal Investigation, Domestic Security Division held a Hot Wash with External Agencies in order to discuss the events, which occurred during the incident. Attendees included representatives from:

(b)(2)

### Discussion Points

(b)(2) & (b)(10)(i)

(b)(2) & (b)(10)(i)



(b)(2) & (b)(10)(i)

## APPENDIX B: IMPROVEMENT PLAN (IP)

*The recommendations listed are based on the issues identified during the Hot Wash, After Action Report, and the After Action Conference as applicable. The IP shall include the Areas for Improvement and corrective actions identified in Section 2: Analysis of Incident. List only one primary organizational segment and Point of Contact for each issue.*

### *Improvement Plan Matrix*

(b)(2) & (b)(10)(i)

*The recommendations listed are based on the issues identified during the Hot Wash, After Action Report, and the After Action Conference as applicable. The IP shall include the Areas for Improvement and corrective actions identified in Section 2: Analysis of Incident. List only one primary organizational segment and Point of Contact for each issue.*

*Improvement Plan Matrix*

(b)(2) & (b)(10)(i)



*The recommendations listed are based on the issues identified during the Hot Wash, After Action Report, and the After Action Conference as applicable. The IP shall include the Areas for Improvement and corrective actions identified in Section 2: Analysis of Incident. List only one primary organizational segment and Point of Contact for each issue.*

*Improvement Plan Matrix*

(b)(2) & (b)(10)(i)



The recommendations listed are based on the issues identified during the Hot Wash, After Action Report, and the After Action Conference as applicable. The IP shall include the Areas for Improvement and corrective actions identified in Section 2: Analysis of Incident. List only one primary organizational segment and Point of Contact for each issue.


*Improvement Plan Matrix*






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*Improvement Plan Matrix*



*The recommendations listed are based on the issues identified during the Hot Wash, After Action Report, and the After Action Conference as applicable. The IP shall include the Areas for Improvement and corrective actions identified in Section 2: Analysis of Incident. List only one primary organizational segment and Point of Contact for each issue.*

*Improvement Plan Matrix*




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*Improvement Plan Matrix*




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*Improvement Plan Matrix*



*The recommendations listed are based on the issues identified during the Hot Wash, After Action Report, and the After Action Conference as applicable. The IP shall include the Areas for Improvement and corrective actions identified in Section 2: Analysis of Incident. List only one primary organizational segment and Point of Contact for each issue.*

*Improvement Plan Matrix*



*The recommendations listed are based on the issues identified during the Hot Wash, After Action Report, and the After Action Conference as applicable. The IP shall include the Areas for Improvement and corrective actions identified in Section 2: Analysis of Incident. List only one primary organizational segment and Point of Contact for each issue.*


*Improvement Plan Matrix*

(b)(2) & (b)(10)(i)



*The recommendations listed are based on the issues identified during the Hot Wash, After Action Report, and the After Action Conference as applicable. The IP shall include the Areas for Improvement and corrective actions identified in Section 2: Analysis of Incident. List only one primary organizational segment and Point of Contact for each issue.*

*Improvement Plan Matrix*



## APPENDIX C: LESSONS LEARNED

*While the After Action Report/Improvement Plan includes recommendations which support development of specific post-incident corrective actions, incidents may also reveal lessons learned which can be shared with the broader Pennsylvania State Police audience. The Bureau of Research and Development, Program Division, will make these observations available to members on the PSP INET as a means of sharing post-incident lessons learned. This appendix provides members with an opportunity to nominate lessons learned from an incident for sharing on link.*

*For reference, the following categories and definitions will be used on this link:*

**Lesson Learned:** *Knowledge and experience, positive or negative, derived from actual incidents, such as the Flight 93 response and the Nickel Mines Shooting, as well as those derived from observations and historical study of operations, training, and incidents.*

**Best Practices:** *Exemplary, peer-validated techniques, procedures, good ideas, or solutions that work and are solidly grounded in actual operations, training, and experiences.*

**Good Stories:** *Exemplary, but non-peer-validated, initiatives (implemented by various Organizational Segments) that have shown success in their specific environments and that may provide useful information to members and leadership.*

**Practice Note:** *A brief description of innovative practices, procedures, methods, programs, or tactics that an organization uses to adapt to changing conditions or to overcome an obstacle or challenge.*

### Nominated Lessons Learned

THIS AREA TO BE USED TO DESCRIBE LESSONS LEARNED IDENTIFIED FOR NOMINATION



## APPENDIX D: ACRONYMS

*Any acronym used in the AAR shall be listed alphabetically and spelled out. This will be valuable for incidents which involve outside agencies or medical terminology.*

Acronym	Meaning
ATF	Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
AV	Aviation
BCI	Bureau of Criminal Investigation
BIPS	Bureau of Integrity and Professional Standards
BORTAC	United States Border Patrol Tactical Unit
BTPD	Barrett Township Police Department-Monroe County, PA
COW	Crew Access Unit
CP	Command Post
CTSP	Connecticut State Police
DA	District Attorney
DWC	Department Watch Center
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FSU	Forensics Services Unit
FTOC	Forward Tactical Operations Center
GCMC	Geisenger Community Medical Center Lackawanna County, PA (Hospital)
HDES	Hazardous Device and Explosive Section
IC	Incident Commander
ICS	Incident Command Structure
IOC	Intelligence Operations Center
MAP	Members Assistance Program
MCP	Mobile Command Post
NJSP	New Jersey State Police
NYSP	New York State Police
PaCIC	Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center
PCCC	Pike County Communications Center
Penn DOT	Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
PIO	Public Information Officer
PMRPD	Pocono Mountain Regional Police Department-Monroe County, PA
PSP	Pennsylvania State Police
SA	Staging Area
SERT	Special Emergency Response Team
SHIELD	Safe Highway Initiative through Effective Law Enforcement and Detection
SPD	Scranton City Police Department-Lackawanna County, PA
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics
USBP	United States Border Patrol
USMS	United States Marshal Service

## APPENDIX E: PARTICIPANT FEEDBACK SUMMARY

*This document serves as a format to enable incident participants a mechanism to provide constructive feedback prior to an After Action Conference. This form should also be distributed to incident participants for use at the incident Hot Wash.*

### PARTICIPANT FEEDBACK FORM

Incident Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Incident Number/Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Participant Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Title: \_\_\_\_\_

Agency: \_\_\_\_\_

#### RECOMMENDATIONS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. Based on the incident and the tasks assigned, list the top 3 strengths and/or areas that need to be improved.

\_\_\_\_\_

2. Is there anything you saw during the incident that a supervisor might not have been able to experience, observe, and record?

\_\_\_\_\_

3. Identify the corrective actions that should be taken to address the issues identified above. For each corrective action, indicate, in your opinion if it is a high, medium, or low priority.

\_\_\_\_\_

4. List the applicable equipment, training, policies, plans, and procedures that should be reviewed, revised, or developed. Indicate the priority level for each.

\_\_\_\_\_

5. Please provide any recommendations on how this incident or future incidents could be improved, enhanced or sustained in future similar incidents.

\_\_\_\_\_

6. Any lessons learned that would be beneficial to other members or the department from your experience?

\_\_\_\_\_